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Budget Analysis and Policy Advocacy: The Role of Non-
governmental Public Action
Mark Robinson
Abstract
This paper examines the impact and significance of independent budget analysis
and advocacy initiatives that are designed to improve budget transparency and
the poverty focus of government expenditure priorities. It draws on case study
research of six budget groups in Brazil, Croatia, India, Mexico, South Africa, and
Uganda, which include non-governmental organisations, research institutions
and social movements. The findings demonstrate that civil society budget initia-
tives contribute to improvements in the transparency of budgetary decisions and
the budget process, increased budget awareness and literacy, and deeper
engagement in the budget process on the part of legislators, the media and
civil society organisations. While the structure of the budget process makes sub-
stantial changes in expenditure priorities difficult to achieve, budget groups
directly contribute to positive impacts on budget allocations and improved
implementation, thereby increasing the accountability of decision-makers.
Tracking of budgetary expenditures and impacts was also found to be effective
in ensuring effective utilisation of education and health expenditures. Increased
budget allocations and improved utilisation of public funds that benefit poor and
disadvantaged groups can ensure greater equity in budget priorities and further
social justice objectives. The activities of budget groups strengthen democracy
by fostering accountability, enhancing transparency and deepening participation
and voice.
Keywords: civil society; budgets; public expenditure; advocacy; accountability;
transparency.
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1 Introduction 1
The past decade has witnessed significant changes in the nature of the public
budget process in developing and transition countries. Until recently the 
budgetary process was viewed as the exclusive preserve of policymakers and
administrators and treated as a purely technical matter for expert consideration.
In many countries legislators had limited involvement in budget debates by
virtue of executive dominance, inadequate comprehension of budget issues, and
partial access to budget information. The scope for deliberating and changing
budget priorities was further constrained by constitutional provisions that 
circumscribe the scope for legislative oversight and intervention. Civil society
involvement was generally confined to specialised lobby groups and business
associations who possessed the knowledge and power to exercise influence.
Much has since changed. Budgets are no longer perceived to be the select
domain of the political executive and technical specialists. Legislators are
increasingly active in budget debates and in reviewing expenditure priorities.
Civil society organisations have acquired the skill and confidence to intervene in
the budget process in a large number of countries. The media is more active in
reporting on budget issues and the misuse of public expenditures.
Greater openness in public budget processes has resulted from the confluence
of several factors. First, the democracy and good governance agenda from the
1990s has focused attention on accountability, transparency and participation as
desirable attributes of effective states, reflecting growing appreciation among
aid donors that political imperatives fundamentally shape budget priorities and
budget outcomes. Democratic institutions are found to perform an important
function in strengthening budget accountability in multi-party political systems,
but legislatures and media organisations do not function effectively in the
absence of organised interests exerting pressure on budgetary priorities (Healey
and Tordoff 1995). Opening up budget processes to improved legislative and 
citizen oversight is considered by commentators as integral to government
accountability and activities designed to achieve this objective are viewed as
increasingly legitimate (Waglé and Shah 2001; Norton and Elson 2002; 
Songco 2001). 
The second factor is the emergence over the past decade of a large number of
independent budget groups in developing and transitional countries that 
constitute the focus of this analysis. The 1990s saw the emergence of a large
number of non-governmental initiatives aimed at deepening citizen engage-
ment in processes of budget analysis and public expenditure management in the
context of wider processes of democratisation and pressures for increased
accountability from civil society.2 A closely-related set of non-governmental 
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1 The research project on which this paper is based was carried out in conjunction with 
Warren Krafchik at the International Budget Project (IBP) in Washington, DC. 
2 The IBP estimates that close to 100 organisations in 70 countries were engaged in this 
type of activity in 2005, compared to less than 10 organisations a decade earlier.
initiatives surfaced in this period to expose gender biases in government 
budgets, often under the auspices of budget groups with a wider remit.3 The
objective of all these initiatives was to improve the poverty and gender focus of
public expenditures and to increase the accountability of government officials
and politicians in decisions concerning the allocation and utilisation of public
resources. Civil society budget groups engaged in these types of activities form
part of an expanding range of legitimate accountability seekers in pursuit of
what some describe as the ‘new accountability agenda’ (Goetz and Jenkins
2005: 15).
A third factor is the political momentum around participatory budgeting with
its origins in Porto Alegre in the mid-1980s, which has now spread to one 
hundred municipalities in Brazil and been adopted by reformist municipal 
governments elsewhere in Latin America. In this influential Brazilian experiment
the emphasis on mass participation in deliberating public budgets was central to
a democratic project of widening citizen engagement and oversight in which
budget priorities would more closely correspond to local priorities and popular
needs (Abers 1998; Navarro 1998; Baiocchi 2001). 
Fourth, there is growing recognition of the centrality of state budgets in
reflecting government policy preferences at a time that public expenditure
management has become an increasingly important facet of development 
policy, with its corollary in general budget support as a preferred instrument for
development assistance on the part of the major aid donors. This trend
emanates from a concern with predictability and transparency in the utilisation
and deployment of scarce public resources and measures to ensure that 
expenditure commitments reflect domestic policy priorities and are supported
by appropriate revenue-raising strategies. In low-income countries the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper process provides some degree of deliberative access
to the budget process for non-governmental and business interests but with
modest scope for influencing priority setting and resource allocations (McGee
and Norton 2000). 
Budget analysis and budget advocacy are now widely regarded as a central
component of a growing arsenal of approaches developed by civil society
organisations for fostering government accountability (Waglé and Shah 2001;
Norton and Elson 2002). Independent budget analysis has a number of parallels
with existing practices fostered by civil society organisations that are designed
to expand societal deliberation in public policy formulation. Lessons from 
experience with efforts to increase citizen participation in economic policy-
making and with tools for improving public accountability offer important points
of reference for this body of work.
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3 See, for example, UNIFEM (2002). Several of the groups reviewed in this research 
played a pioneering role in gender budgets, notably IDASA in South Africa and Fundar
in Mexico (Hofbauer 2006; Robinson and Vyasulu 2006).
One strand of related activity is centred on economic decision-making and the
role of organised interests in shaping policy priorities. Until the late 1990s
macro-economic economic policy in developing and transitional countries was
largely dominated by technocratic elites in government and aid donors
(Brinkerhoff 1996). Generally there was limited societal engagement in 
economic policymaking and priority-setting, with inputs largely confined to
well-organised business lobbies with the capacity to undertake informed analysis
and to exercise influence. The only exceptions were civil society organisations
representing poor and economically disadvantaged groups which gained access
to decision-making through corporatist arrangements and consultative mecha-
nisms or through preferential access to the policy domain by virtue of political
linkages resulting from ideological affinity or political struggle.4 There is now
growing recognition on the part of governments and aid donors that citizen
participation in macro-economic policy deliberation and priority setting can help
to improve allocative efficiency and strengthen the legitimacy of the policy
process with the result that opportunities for access and influence are 
expanding (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2003). 
Civil society initiatives designed to promote social accountability and curb 
corruption through citizen oversight on rural public works in India have been
influential in informing and galvanising similar approaches elsewhere (Jenkins
and Goetz 1999). In particular, the right to information movement in the Indian
state of Rajasthan has demonstrated the importance of supportive legislation to
facilitate public access to government financial records and employment rosters
(Goetz and Jenkins 1999). Civil society organisations in several Indian cities have
experimented with methods that foster state accountability using tools such as
citizen report cards to gauge citizen perceptions of the quality, adequacy and
efficacy of public services (Paul 2002). These approaches have opened up 
decision-making and service delivery to greater public scrutiny and demon-
strated the value of independent citizen action in fostering improved account-
ability. However, beyond ‘naming and shaming’ the perpetrators of corruption,
they generally lack the power to enforce sanctions on public officials found
guilty of indulging in illegal practices and promoting organisational improve-
ments that would improve service delivery outcomes (Goetz and Jenkins 2005:
107–9). 
While there is growing acknowledgement that independent analysis, advocacy
and capacity-building efforts have the potential to influence government budget
priorities and improve the transparency of the budget process, there is limited
evidence on the efficacy and impact of this body of work. The potential impact
of civil society budget work raises high expectations in view of its significance
09 
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4 The best examples of this come from South Africa where businesses, trade unions and 
government are represented in tripartite consultative mechanisms on economic and 
social policies, and where mass organisations like the trade union movement and the 
national civics association have direct access to the ANC government (Robinson and 
Friedman 2005).
both for improved public expenditure management and stronger democratic
accountability. Aid donors believe that independent budget work can strengthen
the efficiency of the budget process and improve the pro-poor orientation of
budget priorities. Practitioners and civil society activists want to learn from 
successful efforts designed to influence the budget process and budget priorities
as a means of legitimising their work and improving its effectiveness. At the
same time, there is some scepticism among academics of the potential impact
of budget activism on account of the difficulty of accessing audited government
accounts.5 Hence, there is a compelling case for a deeper investigation of the
significance of this type of non-governmental public action through comparative
research on what works where, how and why. Independent verification of
international budget work in this vein can both contribute to understanding and
knowledge and provide budget practitioners with a guide to future action by
generating insights on the tools, methods and approaches that have proved
most effective in different national and institutional contexts.
This paper reviews the substance and impact of applied budget work through
case studies and comparative analysis of independent civil society initiatives. It
presents evidence on the impact of activities that seek to improve the 
availability of budget information, transparency, and broader societal 
participation in the budget process on the one hand, and the content of budget
priorities, quality of implementation and expenditure outcomes on the other. In
the process it assesses not only the significance of this body of work for
pro-poor budget formulation and social justice outcomes, but also its 
contribution to a larger democracy-building agenda centred on accountability,
transparency and participation.
2 Accountability, transparency and
participation in the budget process
The more immediate goals of applied budget work are to ensure that 
government budget priorities are consistent with declared policy objectives and
that the financial resources allocated to priority areas are expended fully and
properly. But budget work also has a larger purpose, namely to contribute to
democracy-building in developing and transitional societies where state capacity
is weak and formal political institutions remain unconsolidated. In such contexts
civil society budget initiatives have the potential to strengthen the accountability
of state actors responsible for formulating and implementing public budgets,
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5 Goetz and Jenkins (2005: 89), for example, state that ‘when it comes to scrutinising 
public spending, the near-impossibility of obtaining certified government accounts 
means that citizen efforts can go no further than participatory budget formulation at 
the local level … or else budget analysis at high levels of aggregation, identifying the 
likely impact of proposed public spending on categories of people such as the poor, 
children or women.’
improve the transparency of the budget process, and diversify the range of
actors engaged in the deliberation of budget priorities. 
There are two dimensions of accountability that are relevant for budget work.
Answerability requires decision makers having to provide information about
their actions and to justify the reasons for their choice, while enforcement
implies the application of sanctions from those dissatisfied with these actions or
the rationale provided to justify them. In practice those entitled to demand
answers from decision makers are not the same as those responsible for
imposing sanctions and in most political systems these are carried out by 
discrete institutions that are independent of the executive (Goetz and Jenkins
2005: 9). Legislatures usually perform the answerability function in democracies
whereas enforcement is the responsibility of specialised accountability 
institutions such as auditors-general, parliamentary accounts committees and
anti-corruption agencies which are empowered to investigate the actions and
decisions of bureaucrats and politicians. In a further layer accountability the 
judiciary subjects all these mechanisms to scrutiny to ensure their conformity
with legal norms and constitutional provisions (ibid.: 12). 
These horizontal forms of accountability within state institutions are 
complemented by vertical forms of accountability in which citizens can hold
decision makers to account for their actions. Horizontal accountability is typically
achieved through elections in which citizens have the ability to sanction 
governments for poor performance by ousting them from power. But electoral
systems in many countries, especially in transitional or weakly embedded
democracies, have structural deficiencies which can produce governments that
are vulnerable to elite capture and generate policy priorities that do not 
conform to the wishes of electorates (ibid.: 18–20). For this reason, other
mechanisms also play an important role in promoting vertical accountability, in
particular the means by which citizens organise themselves into associations to
lobby governments for taking action against errant officials or reviewing or
reversing decisions that do not conform to stated intentions. However, while
civil society organisations can promote answerability by advocating sanctions,
providing information to legislators and state accountability agencies and threat-
ening adverse publicity through the media, they generally lack enforcement
powers. 
A further distinction that has relevance for the role and activities of civil society
budget groups is between ex-ante and ex-post accountability. Ex-post accounta-
bility is the more familiar form in which power holders are held to account for
their decisions and actions concerning expenditure priorities after the fact by
the legislature and oversight agencies. But ex-ante accountability exists when
decisions are subject to scrutiny before an action is taken – in the budget
domain this relates to questioning of budget priorities in legislative debates
once the executive has formulated its priorities. Depending on constitutional
provisions governing legislative discretion, legislators can reject or demand 
substantial amendments in the government’s budget proposals before granting
approval, which is tantamount to the exercise of enforcement power in this
form of ex-ante accountability (Goetz and Jenkins 2005: 12). Both forms of
11 
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accountability are pursued through the activities of civil society budget groups,
and correspond respectively to the influence they can exert on the executive
through lobbying and influence at the approval stage and subjecting 
government expenditure priorities to scrutiny and analysis during budget 
implementation. 
Enhancing the accountability of decision-makers is a fundamental objective of
budget work; improving the transparency of the decision-making process is an
equally important goal, centring on how governments formulate priorities and
turn these into actions in the form of expenditure allocations. Executive 
dominance and secrecy are common characteristics of the budget process in
many countries, especially at the formulation stage in which expenditure 
priorities are determined. A further problem is that closed budget processes in
unequal societies can result in priorities that are biased towards elite interests
and not tailored to the needs and priorities of the poor, which underscores the
significance of transparency from the perspective of equity and social justice.
Two dimensions of transparency are especially pertinent to the budget process.
First, budget transparency can mandate the executive to divulge the sources of
data and information used to frame decisions on revenue priorities and 
expenditure allocations. Budget transparency improves the ability of politicians
and citizens to scrutinise government actions by subjecting the factual basis on
which allocative decisions are made to questioning by legislators, the media and
civil society organisations. The prospective legitimacy arising from this form of
openness can incentivise governments to be vigilant in ensuring that the data
supporting their decisions is timely, accurate and verifiable. Second, improved
transparency in the budget process can reveal in the public domain the basis on
which priorities are formulated and clarify the roles of and responsibilities of
individuals in the executive who take these decisions. Hence, a more open
budgetary process both confers legitimacy on the budget process and the 
validity of executive decisions. Both forms of transparency can help to reduce
the scope for corruption through the misallocation of expenditures or the
diversion of public resources for private ends.
There are several means by which budget transparency can be improved. One is
simply an executive decision to strengthen fiduciary oversight mechanisms to
improve transparency and to make information more freely available in the 
public domain. But in practice governments are reluctant to open up the 
budget process to greater scrutiny as this would undermine their discretionary
power. Despite this in-built resistance to improve budget transparency there are
two mechanisms by which budget information becomes more freely available
and the decision-making process more open to public scrutiny. One takes the
form of legislation on access to information and the second is peer pressure
resulting from international surveys of budget transparency. The former can be a
powerful tool for improving the transparency and accountability of government
and often results from organised civic pressure to compel governments to 
introduce legislation as much as the benign intentions of reformist politicians
who recognise the intrinsic benefits of right to information provisions.6 The 
latter takes the form of cross-country comparisons of budget transparency
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undertaken by international organisations like the International Monetary Fund
and the International Budget Project which has sponsored civil society 
assessments in Latin America and elsewhere. These have proved to be a power-
ful tool for persuading governments of the need to improve their rankings,
especially when existing provisions for budget transparency are shown to be
deficient the results are widely disseminated in national and regional media.7
The third criterion that has resonance for assessing the wider significance and
impact of budget work is that of participation and voice. Participation in the
budget process in many countries is typically confined to the executive and, to a
lesser degree, the legislature. The scope for widening participation to include
citizens more generally is usually very limited. The participatory budgeting 
experiments of Porto Alegre and other Brazilian municipalities have not been
scaled-up to the national level despite ostensible federal government commit-
ment. Governments are often reluctant to create opportunities for extending
participation to citizens and their associations on the grounds that it would 
render the budget process inefficient and unmanageable. Elected representa-
tives in the executive are viewed as those best equipped to manage the budget
process and citizens can lobby individual legislators or vote for a change of
government if they are unhappy with executive decisions. Moreover, budget
implementation is treated by officials in finance and planning ministries as their
exclusive prerogative, requiring technical skills that are not possessed by ordinary
citizens and only to a limited extent by legislators.
These views are challenged by proponents of participation in government 
decision-making processes. In addition to the intrinsic virtues of increased 
participation on substantive grounds, there are a number of modalities by which
citizen participation in decisions relating to taxation and expenditure can be
enhanced. These opportunities may be greater at the local level where there is
scope for more intensive interactions with decision makers and where the 
powers of local governments are delimited by legislation concerning fiscal
decentralisation (Blair 2000; Robinson 2004). The distinction between direct
and indirect forms of participation serves to distinguish how far it is realistic to
expect citizens to exert tangible influence over expenditure decisions as
opposed to indirect influence through their elected representatives in the 
legislature. In this respect it would be unfair to judge the significance of budget
work in developing and transitional countries by standards of participation that
are not achievable in established representative democracies. At the same time,
IDS WORKING PAPER 279
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6 In a noteworthy example, state and national legislation on the right to information in 
India was driven in significant measure by a campaign waged by civil society activists led
by the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan to facilitate its work on 
exposing corruption in local public works programmes (Goetz and Jenkins 1999).
7 The third Latin American Index of Budget Transparency completed in 2005, reports on 
results from eight countries in the region and highlights progress by governments over
time on different dimensions of budget transparency. See 
www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/LA05.htm (accessed 5 September 06).
there is sometimes scope for more direct forms of participation, for example in
tracking expenditure outcomes in which the poor and their representatives are
able to monitor whether allocations have resulted in physical outputs that can
be independently verified.
There are, in addition, two indirect ways in which opportunities for
participation in the budget process can be extended through organised citizen
engagement. One is by enhancing the capacity of elected representatives to
participate more actively in the budget process by arming them with accurate
and accessible information to scrutinise expenditure decisions and budget
implementation. This is especially important for legislators who occupy key roles
in official accountability and oversight mechanisms such as legislative budget
and public accounts committees which review internal audit reports on govern-
ment spending, often with the power to recommend sanctions and of enforce-
ment. Budget groups can assist legislators in becoming more active participants
in budget debates through training in fiscal literacy and by equipping them with
independent sources of data and information. 
The second approach to deepening indirect participation in the budget process
is by providing voice to socially-excluded and marginalised citizens to ensure
their priorities are taken into account in budget debates and reviews of
implementation. Conventional forms of voice and accountability – voting in
elections and expressing preferences through political parties – have worked
imperfectly as means of safeguarding the interests of the poor and have not
systematically challenged elite bias in decision making (Goetz and Jenkins 2005:
28). Some states have established consultative mechanisms to solicit the views
of the poor on policies and programmes that affect them directly but these are
only of limited efficacy in obliging officials to take action or in holding them to
account. Defined by Goetz and Jenkins (ibid.: 29) as ‘the variety of ways in
which people express beliefs, articulate preferences and advance their interests’,
voice provides a medium through which questions about government decisions
and actions can be articulated by ordinary citizens outside the realm of formal
electoral politics. When translated into mobilisation and collective action it
becomes a form of political participation in its own right. But in practice, voice
is typically mediated by organisations that represent the poor, either as 
membership organisations (such as unions and social movements) or civil society
groups that advocate their interests in public forums (Robinson 1998). This type
of mediated voice represents an indirect form of participation that is typically
articulated by civil society budget groups which advocate for budget priorities
from the vantage point of the poor and socially-excluded and whose analysis is
informed by the needs and priorities of this constituency.8
To summarise, budget work has the potential to deepen democracy by
strengthening accountability, fostering transparency and encouraging 
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8 This is best exemplified by DISHA in Gujarat, which is a social movement that uses 
budget analysis to advocate for positions that advance its members’ interests as one 
strategy alongside mobilisation and direct forms of collective action (Malajovich and 
Robinson 2006).
participation. Independent budget work can improve vertical accountability by
questioning the decisions and actions of politicians and officials who are
responsible for formulating and implementing budget priorities, and improving
the efficacy of horizontal oversight mechanisms that form part of the state
accountability machinery. Budget transparency has the potential to open up
decision-making to greater public scrutiny and influence and to make the
sources of data and information on revenue flows and expenditures available in
the public domain, which can improve the legitimacy of the budget process and
help to curb corruption. Right to information legislation and international 
comparisons of budget transparency strengthen the political case for more 
rigorous standards. While the scope for enhancing direct participation in the
budget process remains limited, there are a variety of ways in which legislative
participation can be enhanced and voices of the poor articulated by civil society
organisations by strengthening capacity, providing information, and identifying
avenues through which influence can be exerted through targeted lobbying and
advocacy efforts. The next section examines the range of initiatives promoted by
civil society organisations in different parts of the world.
3 Assessing the significance of civil
society budget initiatives
The findings presented in this paper draw on comparative cross-country
research which entailed the analysis and dissemination of budget data, advocacy
initiatives designed to influence budget priorities and efforts to improve the
transparency of the budget process. Key questions investigated in the course of
the research were the impact of non-governmental public action on budget
processes, priority setting, and expenditure outcomes; the strengths and limita-
tions of different approaches and methods for independent budget analysis and
advocacy work; and the contextual factors and institutional features that explain
successful impact and engagement. In particular the research set out to deter-
mine how far government budget priorities and expenditure allocations and
outcomes have been influenced by civil society budget initiatives in a manner
that benefits poor and socially-excluded groups.9
The research centres on six detailed case studies of independent budget work in
Brazil, Croatia, India, Mexico, South Africa and Uganda, where non-governmen-
tal public actors have been engaged in budget analysis and budget advocacy for
a period of 5–10 years.10 The type of organisations engaged in this type of work
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9 The research was supported by various funding bodies. For details see 
Acknowledgements (p 6).
10 Full-length versions of the six case studies are available on the IBP website at 
www.internationalbudget.org/casestudies.htm. These are listed by author in the 
References (from p 31).
ranges from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), networks and social
movements, through to research organisations. For many of these organisations
budget work forms only a part of a broader set of activities, and in some cases
they have created special units for budget work.11
Located in the Indian state of Gujarat, DISHA (Developing Initiatives for Social
and Human Interaction) is a social movement representing unions of tribals and
labourers which developed budget work in the mid-1990s as a means of
supporting their claims for land and labour entitlements. At the other end of
the spectrum the Institute for Public Finance (IPF) in Croatia is a publicly-funded
research organisation which analyses a wide range of public expenditure policy
issues. IDASA (Institute for Democracy in South Africa) is a leading South
African NGO that established the Budget Information Service in 1995 to 
coordinate its work on budget analysis with a focus on women, children and
HIV/AIDS. Fundar in Mexico and IBASE (Brazilian Institute for Social and
Economic Analysis) are NGOs with a broader mandate for promoting human
rights and government accountability on the one hand and citizen education
and empowerment on the other, in both cases within a broader project of
democratisation. The Uganda Debt Network (UDN) is an NGO that emerged
out of a coalition working on debt and poverty reduction. 
Despite differences in perspective and organisational type, they all share a 
commitment to social justice and upholding the rights of the poor, and their
approach to budget work is shaped by these normative principles. Budget 
analysis and advocacy is motivated by a commitment to increasing the influence
of the poor and marginalised in the budget process and to ensuring that budget
priorities reflect the needs and priorities of this broad constituency. This is 
evident from the social groups prioritised in their analysis and advocacy work –
low-income people, women, children, and dalits (former untouchables) and 
tribals in India – with employment, education, health and HIV/AIDS as focal
issues.
The six organisations all work on different aspects of public budgeting around a
common core of activities centred on information, analysis, advocacy and 
capacity building. The principal activities within the budget process include work
to promote the availability of budget information and measures to improve
budget transparency and broaden participation. All six organisations undertake
capacity-building to promote awareness and understanding of public budgets
among legislators, NGOs, journalists and civic leaders. Several organisations
work to improve budget outcomes through advocacy work designed to 
influence budget policies (i.e. allocations between major items of expenditure),
the quality of implementation (the proportion of the allocations actually
expended and the efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure targeting) and the
utilisation of expenditures (how far budget allocations translate into physical
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11 These units have no more than ten staff and budget groups usually have a limited 
number of technical specialists and modest financial resources.
outputs). Most of the work centres on national and state-level budgets, though
several organisations are engaged in activities at the local government level
(India, Mexico and Uganda), mostly on tracking expenditure allocations and 
outcomes (see, for example, Heimans 2002). Four of the six groups focus 
mostly on the expenditure side of the budget and only two address revenue
issues.12
The research used a combination of methods and data sources to establish 
evidence of impact. For investigating impact on budget policies the research
drew on quantitative data assembled and synthesised by budget groups with a
view to discerning trends in government spending on social welfare, education
and health as areas of expenditure that matter most to the poor. Data on 
budget out-turns provide evidence of implementation, while physical verification
of investments carried out by budget groups was the main source of
information to ascertain expenditure outcomes. The main challenge was to
establish attribution of any observed changes in budget allocations, quality of
implementation and outcomes to the activities of the budget groups 
independent of the interventions of other state and non-state actors and
broader economic trends. 
For evidence on the influence of the groups on the budget process the
research drew primarily on qualitative data gathered from key informant inter-
views with politicians, government officials and representatives of civil society
organisations. Qualitative interviews and focus group discussions were the 
principal method used to determine the impact of capacity-building and efforts
to broaden participation, especially where insights gathered from different
actors served to corroborate the findings. Further evidence was available from
laws and procedures governing budget transparency, especially where changes
could be traced with some with some certainty to the activities of these
groups. Secondary documentation and media reports were used to supplement
interview data. 
Field visits of 10–15 days’ duration were undertaken by pairs of researchers.13
The case studies set out to document the full range of activities undertaken by
budget groups, with a focus on interventions centred on data analysis and 
dissemination, capacity-building, advocacy efforts designed to influence budget
policies and the transparency of the budget process, and expenditure tracking.
The intention of the research was to establish what impacts had been achieved
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12 The IPF in Croatia focuses both on tax and expenditure policies while Fundar under
takes analysis of government revenues through its work on the oil sector funded by 
Revenue Watch, an initiative supported by the Open Society Institute. For details see 
www.revenuewatch.org.
13 The six research teams each consisted of an academic and a budget practitioner from 
another continent in the interest of maximising the value of different perspectives to 
promote cross-learning. In most cases the teams included an economist and a political 
scientist to combine different analytical skills.
in these areas of activity and to develop explanations for the observed impacts,
as a means of generating broader lessons from the activities of groups 
operating in different institutional and political contexts. 
The following section draws on the findings of the research to consider the
impact of applied budget work through changes in budget allocations and
implementation and influence on the budget process on the one hand, and its
broader significance for accountability, transparency and participation on the
other.
4 The impact and significance of
applied budget work
4.1 Budget policies and implementation
The findings from the case study research lead to a number of conclusions on
the impact and significance of applied budget work and point to several 
explanations for how various impacts were achieved. The impacts fall into two
principal categories: changes in budget policies and changes in the budget
process. Changes in budget policy are reflected in increases in expenditure 
allocations, the quality of implementation or execution (i.e. the efficiency and
effectiveness of expenditures), and expenditure outcomes in terms of physical
outputs. Overall, the research found that the most significant impacts achieved
by independent budget groups lie in improving budget transparency and budget
awareness on the one hand, and enhancing budgetary resources for existing
programmes and improvements in the efficiency of expenditure utilisation on
the other. 
4.1.1 Budget allocation
The case study findings provide evidence that the analysis carried out by 
independent budget groups can directly lead to positive improvements in 
budget policies in the form of increased allocations for social welfare 
expenditure priorities by highlighting the inadequacy of existing allocations and
discrepancies between commitments and actual disbursements. The most 
significant documented impacts take the form of increased allocations of
budgetary resources for reproductive health in Mexico, child support grants in
South Africa, and tribal development expenditure in Gujarat. These important
precedents demonstrate that budget advocacy has the potential to influence
decisions to introduce new programmes and to leverage additional financial
resources for programmes that have already received legislative approval.
In the Mexican case, Fundar managed to achieve a ten-fold increase in the
2003 budgetary allocation for a national programme designed to combat
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maternal mortality through emergency health care provision as a direct result of
its gender budget analysis and lobbying efforts. This represented a budgetary
increase in the order of US$50 million for a programme that has the potential
to directly benefit pregnant women, especially those from poorer, indigenous
communities. However, the difficulties in accessing budget data from state 
governments where the problem of maternal mortality is most acute meant
that it was difficult to track the use of the enhanced budgets and establish
whether they had been invested in improved obstetric care. Ultimately the
impact of this work would be evident in a reduction in maternal mortality
which is one of the Millennium Development Goals which has particular
resonance in Mexico (Robinson and Vyasulu 2006).
IDASA’s Children’s Budget Unit in South Africa used budget analysis to monitor
federal budget allocations and programmes designed for children from low-
income families and to highlight challenges regarding the delivery of services in
active collaboration with other organisations advocating for child rights. The
campaign was spearheaded by the Alliance for Children’s Entitlement to Social
Security and drew on budget information provided by the CBU. The campaign
was successful in its objective of increasing the resources originally committed in
the national budget for the Child Support Grant when it was first introduced in
1998 and raising the maximum eligibility age to fourteen years. The level of the
grant has since kept pace with inflation, partly as a result of ongoing monitor-
ing and advocacy work by IDASA and its allies.14 As with the Mexican case, civil
society advocacy predicated on robust analysis successfully contributed to an
increase in the budget envelope for a new government initiative (Hofbauer
2006).
A third example, from DISHA in Gujarat, concerns the allocation and utilisation
of an existing budget line designed for the socio-economic advancement of
tribals (indigenous peoples), namely the Tribal Sub-Plan (TSP). In Gujarat 15 per
cent of the state government budget is channelled through the Sub-Plan in line
with the tribal share of the population, either directly for special programmes
earmarked for this group or as a geographical share of large infrastructure
investments. Detailed analysis of state expenditure patterns from the mid-1990s
revealed that government spending commitments fell below this level and that
allocations were not being utilised effectively. Sustained mobilisation by the
unions affiliated with DISHA through marches and demonstrations publicised
the extent of the under-spend and placed pressure on the government to
respond. This combination of collective action and analysis contributed to a
modest increase in allocations as a percentage of total expenditure over the
five-year period from 1994–99, though this increase largely reflected a propor-
tionate increase in the gross state domestic product and overall public spending.
More significantly, there was a steep increase in the level of implementation of
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14 The government proposed to set the level of the grant at ZAR90 per month when it 
was first introduced in 1998/99 and this was raised to ZAR100 per month as a result of
pressure from child rights groups. Warren Krafchik, pers. comm.
the TSP budget, from an under-spend of the 1993 budget of 20 per cent to an
over-spend (in excess of the budget allocation) of 20 per cent in 1996, settling
down to level implementation thereafter. While it is difficult to attribute this
improvement in budget implementation to DISHA’s interventions with 
complete certainty, informed commentators in Gujarat confirm that its advocacy
efforts contributed in some measure to more effective utilisation of budget
allocations for tribal welfare (Malajovich and Robinson 2006).
4.1.2 Expenditure tracking
There was more widespread success in tracking expenditure outcomes which
can result in substantial savings through improved efficiency and reduced 
corruption. Both DISHA and the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) provide good
illustrations of how tracking expenditure outcomes generated substantial 
additional resources by reducing misallocations or enhancing resource availability
for development investments at the local level. In the UDN case, systematic
monitoring of government budget commitments and implementation in a
number of localities across the country (35 sub-counties in 7 districts) through
community-based monitors identified a number of shortcomings. These include
the quality of building materials for the construction of classrooms not being in
conformity with technical specifications due to the use of poor quality or
inadequate materials, the absence of essential drugs from health centres, and
teacher absenteeism. The community monitors report such cases to the local
authorities to ensure appropriate action against errant officials and to increase
or reassign resource allocations in line with budget provisions (Azeem et al.
2006).
DISHA has developed a method for tracking expenditure allocations in the state
budget for use in local council (panchayat) jurisdictions. Following legislative
approval of the state budget, DISHA informs elected councillors in village 
panchayats in writing of specific allocations under the state budget for local
infrastructure purposes and asks if physical implementation is underway. Where
there is no knowledge of the allocation or implementation (as is often found to
be the case), DISHA writes to the relevant minister in the government who
then compels the local administration to release the designated allocations. This
has proved to be a very effective way of placing pressure on the local govern-
ment machinery to ensure that financial resources for local infrastructure 
development are being utilised for the designated purpose.15
4.1.3 The significance and limitations of budget analysis
These examples demonstrate that applied budget work can produce significant
quantitative results in terms of increasing financial allocations for specific
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15 This process is set out at length in Annex 3 of the DISHA study (Malajovich and 
Robinson 2006).
programmes and in ensuring that expenditure allocations are implemented fully
and used efficiently. Moreover, the additional allocations were in areas that
directly contribute to social justice and equity outcomes by increasing the
resources available to poor indigenous women for emergency obstetric health-
care and contributing to a reduction in the prevalence of maternal mortality in
Mexico, increasing child welfare support for low-income black households in
South Africa, and improving the efficiency of expenditure allocations for tribal
welfare in India. Expenditure tracking improved the utilisation of development
resources for the benefit of tribal and poor rural communities in Gujarat and
Uganda. Advocacy work helped to ensure that incremental expenditures were
sustained rather than one-off commitments which were then eroded over
time.
It is also important to recognise that the benefits resulting from budget analysis
and budget tracking are not confined to changes in budget allocations and
more efficient utilisation of funds, important as these are from the perspective
of pro-poor spending priorities. Civil society budget initiatives also contributed
to improved accountability by enhancing the answerability of the political 
executive in relation to policy decisions and budget commitments. The failure of
governments to devote adequate budgetary resources in line with policy 
commitments required legislative intervention in Mexico and Gujarat, in which
legislators held the executive to account in budget debates using the analysis
and information provided by independent budget groups, thereby strengthening
ex-post accountability. Budget tracking in Uganda provided an opportunity for
legislators to raise concerns on the utilisation of government resources and to
enforce expenditure commitments at the local level. In the South African case,
lobbying and analysis by a civil society coalition led to enhanced budgetary 
commitments prior to legislative deliberation, thereby serving as a case of ex-
ante accountability. All these examples demonstrate that the significance of
budget analysis and budget tracking extends beyond financial benefits, carrying
with it more fundamental implications for executive accountability.
These are considerable achievements, but three caveats should be noted with
respect to the overall impact of these initiatives on budget policies. While the
Mexican and South African cases demonstrate that the additional resources
generated from successful advocacy initiatives can be in the order of tens of
millions of dollars, these remain relatively small as a proportion of overall 
government spending. Second, it was not possible to test whether there were
major changes in budget policies through the reallocation of resources from
one line of spending to another. 
Furthermore, it may be unrealistic to expect major changes in budget priorities
on account of structural and procedural limitations built into the budget process
in many countries. Substantial changes in expenditure priorities are difficult to
achieve on account of constitutional provisions governing legislative review and
approval. In Mexico, for example, the budget formulation period leading up to
the congressional debate is a closed process in which expenditures are matched
with plan priorities by technical staff in the line departments in conformity with
the six-year Presidential Plan. Consequently, legislators and civil society more
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generally have limited scope for intervention in this stage of the process. The
legislature cannot propose new projects and budget lines and is only able to
recommend changes up to 5 per cent of the total budget, subject to executive
veto. In Gujarat, as with other parliamentary systems, the government would
fall in a vote of confidence if the budget was not approved in full. Hence, the
structure of the budget process limits the scope for legislative review and 
significant revisions outside the electoral cycle in presidential systems like that of
Mexico or in the annual budget cycle in parliamentary systems. At the same
time, groups in India and South Africa have successfully intervened to influence
executive decisions governing budget allocations at the budget formulation
stage, through lobbying and providing information on under-spends and 
misallocations in the previous financial year.
A key finding emerging from this analysis is that advocacy efforts to revise
budget allocations or to introduce new budget lines have limited room for
manoeuvre outside electoral or budget cycles. For this reason, small adjust-
ments in overall budgetary allocations and improved implementation through
systematic budget analysis and tracking and targeted advocacy are the most 
likely outcome in countries where the scope for legislative discretion is limited.
Achieving significant increases in budget allocations where there is substantial
benefit to poor and marginalised social groups is therefore a major achievement
and the case studies present evidence that demonstrates such changes are 
possible through independent budget work. The challenge for budget groups is
how to replicate and scale-up these achievements through a variety of
strategies, including advocacy to influence executive action and improve 
legislative oversight.
4.2 Information, transparency and participation
4.2.1 Budget awareness and literacy
In addition to efforts to influence budget policies, independent budget groups
undertake a range of activities designed to promote awareness of budgets,
improve budget transparency and deepen participation in the budget process.
Awareness-building work mainly focuses on legislators and civil society organisa-
tions with a view to improving understanding of the importance of budgets as a
critical policy instrument and building budget literacy. Budget groups pursue this
objective through training and capacity-building initiatives to broaden the range
of actors and organisations that are engaged in deliberations on budget 
priorities. 
In many developing countries only a small proportion of legislators are actively
involved in budget debates, partly on account of limited understanding of the
significance of the budget and lack of familiarity with technical content. Budget
groups assist legislators in becoming more conversant with budgets in several
ways: by organising special training seminars, providing information about 
budget policies in an accessible form, and responding to queries about the
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nature and content of budget proposals. The case studies from India, Mexico,
South Africa and Uganda demonstrate the importance of this type of work, in
that more informed and legislators play a more active role in budget debates,
scrutinise and review budget policies, and hold government decision-makers to
account, in the process contributing to improved ex-post accountability. 
For example, DISHA provides individual state legislators in Gujarat with short
summaries of the main departmental reports the evening before the budget
debate, containing information on various aspects of budget policies and 
implementation, to enable them to play an active role in budget review and
approval. Opposition legislators are able to hold ministers to account and raise
questions during debates on budget priorities. In Mexico Fundar provides 
orientation sessions for legislators on various aspects of the federal budget and
provides members of the congressional budget committee with a steady supply
of information and analysis. Other groups such as the IPF in Croatia do not
have face-to-face engagement with legislators but provide information that is
used to feed into political debate on budget priorities, thereby providing an
authoritative and critical source of independent budget information (Shultz and
Van Zyl 2006). 
Capacity building efforts extend beyond legislators to include a wider range of
civil society organisations. Budget groups in Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa,
and Uganda conduct training for their partners and other NGO representatives
by conducting budget literacy workshops to assist them in understanding 
budgets and their policy implications. IBASE in Brazil focuses on long-term 
public education on budget issues. It has developed various training packages for
the general public and citizen leaders to promote budget awareness and
strengthen capacity for budget monitoring, initially in Rio de Janeiro and then
to other municipalities. More recently it has developed distance learning 
packages which reach 350 participants annually (de Renzio and Schultz 2006).
Fundar works with local organisations in several southern states in Mexico to
strengthen skills in budget analysis and policy advocacy. DISHA conducts training
for elected local government representatives in Gujarat on a large scale which
complements its budget tracking work. Similarly UDN trains community 
monitors in budget tracking in the districts in which it has a presence and offers
training to NGOs in budget analysis at the national level. 
All the groups produce specialised information products on different aspects of
the budget. Five groups produce accessible information on budget analysis from
the vantage point of the poor, focusing on sectors and programmes that are
oriented to their needs. In several countries the budget groups are the sole
source of public information regarding budgets outside government. Their
analysis is regarded as solid, timely and reliable and provides an important 
analytic contribution to public debates on the budget. In this regard, the analysis
produced by the IPF in Croatia is regarded as authoritative by policymakers and
academics that constitute the primary audience for its information products in
an environment where civil society is relatively weak.16 IDASA’s analysis is also
valued by policymakers and academics, but it also reaches a broader range of
stakeholders through its work.
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Other budget groups produce a wide range of publications that contribute both
to knowledge and advocacy efforts. These range from short pamphlets for
campaigning purposes to in-depth studies along the lines of the influential
series on gender budgeting produced by IDASA, designed for a range of policy,
academic and activist audiences. For instance, IBASE published a quarterly
‘Budget & Democracy’ Bulletin over a ten-year period from 1991 which was 
distributed to 1,500 organisations in order to increase the general awareness
and understanding of budget issues, provide an independent analysis of govern-
ment policies, and publicise initiatives to increase civil society participation in
budget processes, monitoring and advocacy. Fundar also produced a regular
quarterly bulletin (Pesos y Contrapesos) for a wide range of stakeholders 
concerned with budget issues, while DISHA focuses its attention on a Gujarati
publication in a broadsheet format which is designed to reach elected 
representatives and activists working at the local level. The IPF produces regular
newsletters on tax and expenditure issues that have a circulation of 2,000, 
primarily politicians, government officials and the media. UDN’s newsletter has
a circulation of in excess of 10,000. The case studies documented several 
innovative methodologies and dissemination tools that are employed by budget
groups to this end, including the use of the internet to spread budget aware-
ness in Brazil through to the production of citizen guides to expenditures and
taxes in Croatia. 
While it is difficult to quantify the impact of capacity building and information
products it was apparent from interview responses in each country that these
had a major effect in raising awareness and understanding of budget issues
among legislators and civil society organisations. Budget groups provided an
authoritative source of information on budget issues and in several cases were
the only source of information and expertise outside government. Legislators
learned more about the technical dimensions of the budget process from these
activities than from political parties or resources and information provided
through government auspices (such as legislative information services), which
highlights the critical role played by budget groups in strengthening budget 
literacy at this level.
The media provide a valuable outlet for budget information in several countries
and are actively cultivated as an ally for advocacy purposes. Evidence from
Gujarat demonstrates that DISHA is regarded as the sole source of legitimate
budget information and analysis by the leading newspapers which use this on a
regular basis in their reporting on budget issues. In Mexico the press has actively
utilised reports and briefings produced by Fundar and its allies to highlight
budget issues and cases of misuse of government funds.17 The UDN has 
16 The reports produced by the IPF are used by trade unions which share the material 
with their members an input into policy dialogue with the government (Schultz and 
Van Zyl 2006).
17 The Mexican press prominently reported the results of investigations carried out by 
Fundar and its allies over a two-month period in 2004 over the misallocation of
HIV/AIDS funds to the leading anti-abortion organisation which contributed to a 
successful campaign to recover the money (Robinson and Vyasulu 2006: 19–22). 
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provided material on government budgets for use by local radio in Uganda. In
these various ways the press and broadcast media not only provide a platform
for disseminating budget information but they also contribute to improved
transparency where the availability of official government information is limited.
4.2.2 Budget transparency
Improved budget transparency is a major objective of several budget groups and
the research evidence confirms that this is an area of significant and positive
impact. Budget groups contribute to enhanced budget transparency in two
ways: through the provision of information on government budget policies in
the public domain and by using right to information legislation to access and
publicise official data. Training legislators in budget issues also contributes to
improved transparency by enabling them to engage more effectively in budget
debates and demand information from the executive.
Several groups contribute to enhanced budget transparency by publishing 
budget data in summary or complete form through publications or on the 
internet. DISHA undertakes a thorough analysis of all the departmental reports
in Gujarat as a basis for its budget summaries that are provided to the media
and to parliamentarians for use in budget debates. DISHA also cross-checks the
accuracy of government data and publicises the large number of factual errors
that appear in official reports each year. But this information is not provided in
a comprehensive or accessible manner to the general public and its contribution
to transparency is therefore more limited. Fundar has made an acknowledged
contribution to budget transparency over the past few years by publishing 
government budget data on its website as a resource for use by legislators, the
media and civil society actors. 
Improving budget transparency is closely linked to anti-corruption efforts.
Several budget groups have managed to identify cases where public resources
have been misused by placing government budget data in the public domain.
Some are active partners in anti-corruption networks, drawing on their
specialist skills in budget analysis and advocacy. For example the UDN was
instrumental in the creation of the Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda
(ACCU), which was established to mobilise local citizens and local communities
to demand government action to combat corruption. Since 1999, ACCU has
been sponsoring an annual ‘anti-corruption week’, during which it organises
phone-in radio talk shows on corruption issues, broadcasts television programs
on how corruption can be eliminated, and organises participatory anti-
corruption events like art exhibitions, essay competitions, and public rallies.18
18 UDN staff revealed that the Inspector General of Government (IGG) – Uganda’s 
ombudsman – had acknowledged that the ACCU’s anti-corruption week had raised the
profile of corruption and, as a result, the IGG had received many official complaints 
from local communities regarding acts of corruption by local officials. In 2000, UDN 
compiled a dossier that comprehensively examined the causes, incidences, 
IDS WORKING PAPER 279
25
Budget groups contribute to larger transparency objectives by facilitating the
creation and functioning of official mechanisms to guarantee access to informa-
tion and accountability, in some cases with strong enforcement powers. In
Mexico Fundar’s early work on exposing secrecy in government influenced the
implementation of federal legislation to ensure public access to information and
the creation of a review and enforcement agency to compel government
departments to comply with the provisions of the legislation. It successfully used
the new right to information law to extract budget data from the finance 
ministry which in turn acknowledges the valuable role that Fundar has played in
this regard. It has also worked with a new independent accountability agency to
further its efforts to access government information in pursuit of its advocacy
work on maternal mortality and misallocation of funds for HIV/AIDS prevention.
In recognition of the critical importance of access to information to budget
work at the federal level, Fundar is also part of wider efforts to secure 
legislation in states where budget information remains inaccessible outside 
government.19 Conversely, the absence of supportive legislation significantly
constrains the contribution that civil society groups can make to budget 
transparency, by denying access to official budget data, exemplified by DISHA’s
experience in Gujarat.
4.2.3 Participation in the budget process
A further area where budget groups have sought to make a contribution is in
broadening participation in the budget process, especially on the part of poor
and marginalised people who lack voice and access. Several groups have 
successfully contributed to deepening legislative participation in budget debates
and have facilitated the involvement of other civil society organisations in 
budget deliberations with government. For example, UDN presents the results
of its budget monitoring work to forums at local and national levels attended
by politicians, government officials and civil society organisations which leads to
a wider and more inclusive debate on the use of government funds for develop-
ment purposes. The production of a simple citizen’s guide to the budget has
further broadened civil society participation in budget dialogue at the local level.
But this has generally not extended to widening the scope for involvement of
ordinary citizens and there are only a few instances where this has occurred.
IBASE in Brazil provides a rare illustration of an organisation that has prioritised
citizen engagement in the budget process through its training and information
activities for the general public and civic leaders in Rio de Janeiro. DISHA 
produces a newsletter which explains the significance of the budget to local
manifestations, effects of corruption, and it regularly publishes booklets on corruption 
in several local languages (de Renzio and Schultz 2006).
19 Fundar’s leading role in the compilation of a Latin American Transparency Index in 
association with budget groups in other countries in the region formed the basis for
advocacy work on budget transparency in Mexico (Robinson and Vyasulu 2006). See 
footnote 7.
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politicians and activists in Gujarat. But the extent to which better information
and improved awareness translates into broader participation is more difficult to
determine.
The tendency of budget groups to focus their capacity-building and advocacy
efforts more narrowly on legislators, the media and other civil society groups
does not diminish the significance of their efforts to broaden participation in
the budget process. The relatively small size of the budget groups in terms of
staff and resources and the technical content of the budget may mean that
broad-based participation is not be a feasible goal of this type of work. The
structure of the budget process, especially in federal and presidential systems, is
often not amenable to broader participation. In such contexts, specialist inter-
mediaries with the appropriate technical skills and access to decision makers, as
well as linkages to a broader array of groups in civil society, may be in a better
position to exercise influence. Broader engagement in deliberating and 
influencing expenditure priorities may only be feasible where there is govern-
ment commitment and political space for this to happen, as in the case of the
participatory budgeting exercises in Porto Alegre and other Brazilian 
municipalities. At the same time, budget groups have the potential to leverage
broader participation where their analysis can directly feed into wider
campaigns where the scope for participation is much greater, as the examples
of tribal welfare in India and maternal mortality in India clearly demonstrate. 
5 Accounting for success
The key explanatory factors that shape the positive impact of independent
budget groups appear to be as follows: the legitimacy acquired from quality
analysis and timely and effective dissemination; the strength and flexibility of
broader alliances in civil society; the quality of relationships established with
government and the legislature; the depth and extent of legislative engagement
in budget deliberation and review; and the openness and flexibility of the 
budget process. The first three factors represent various dimensions of organisa-
tional strategy while the latter two relate to the nature and structure of the
budget process.
Independent budget groups in the six countries have all acquired legitimacy for
their work through the production of timely, accurate and accessible data, and
are often the sole source of budget information outside the government.
Technical aptitude combined with effective communications skills are essential
ingredients for any successful budget organisation and strengthen their ability to
engage effectively in the budget process. The high intellectual standing of the
IPF in Croatia as an independent research organisation was a critical element in
its ability to reach and inform policymakers and politicians. But other types of
non-governmental budget groups also acquired credibility on account of the
quality and timeliness of the data they produce in a form that is accessible to
legislators, the media and other civil society organisations. 
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The formation of flexible alliances with other civil society organisations was a
critical ingredient in successful budget advocacy. Budget groups tend to be small
and have limited human and financial resources at their disposal. Their ability to
acquire specialised knowledge and organisational capacity for mounting 
effective campaigns is limited. But when budget groups form alliances with
other specialised advocacy organisations with wider constituencies the potential
to achieve positive impact is much greater. Fundar formed a coalition with 
feminist organisations and reproductive health groups in Mexico in pursuing a
successful campaign for a dedicated budget line for a programme of emergency
obstetric care to prevent maternal mortality and for successfully uncovering 
illegal misallocations of HIV/AIDS funds. The alliance of child rights organisations
that worked alongside IDASA in South Africa was critical to its ability to 
campaign for a new child support programme with adequate budgetary
resources. Similarly, DISHA drew on its network of unions and social move-
ments in its efforts to increase government expenditure on tribal development
programmes. The lesson emerging from the evidence is that budget analysis can
contribute to improved knowledge and understanding through the development
of appropriate tools and communications strategies but a wider coalition of
interests is invariably required to successfully campaign for changes in budget
policies and to monitor implementation.
The case studies indicate that effective alliances with other civil society 
organisations are integral to successful campaigns. But the evidence also
demonstrates that strategies designed to build direct relationships with 
legislators and government officials can help to ensure access to legislative
debates and the policymaking sphere. The experience of DISHA, Fundar and
IDASA shows that the systematic building of relationships with legislators, 
especially those serving on special legislative committees responsible for public
expenditure or the social sectors, can play a major role in ensuring that the
materials they produce feed into budget debates and decisions on expenditure
allocations. Linkages between budget groups in civil society and legislators in
political society form the basis for tactical interventions in the budget process
and strengthen the legitimacy of applied budget work. 
The provision of independent budget information and making this more 
accessible to citizens was also well-received in some instances by government
policymakers. For example, government officials in the finance ministry in
Mexico welcomed the efforts of Fundar to make official data more accessible
and open to scrutiny as it complemented their interest in improving 
accountability in the use of government funds at the national and state levels
and in ensuring that executive policy commitments were reflected in budget
allocations. In regard to leveraging additional resources for programmes to 
tackle the problem of maternal mortality it was perceived to be a critical ally.
Similar commonalities of interest were also evident in South Africa and Uganda.
In other cases civil society engagement in the budget process was regarded as a
nuisance since successful advocacy could place greater demands on the 
executive and bureaucracy from the legislature to be more open and 
transparent in decision-making.
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While organisational capacity and strategic alliances have a significant bearing
on the impact of budget work, there are structural features of the budget
process that govern what is possible in different environments. In some 
countries, especially those with political systems characterised by strong 
executive authority and weak legislative traditions such as Mexico and Croatia,
the budget process remains relatively impervious to legislative oversight; this can
limit the extent to which a strategy of prioritising the legislative domain can
substantively influence budget priorities. In such contexts, work on deepening
budget awareness in civil society and the media and promoting budget 
transparency may hold greater promise. An active legislature which can engage
in budget debates and influence executive decisions offers a more receptive
environment for work on budget policies. Finally, as the case studies have
demonstrated, the openness and flexibility of the budget process shapes the
scope of independent budget work to influence expenditure allocations, since
priorities set by the executive may not be amenable to legislative amendment.
In such contexts, advocacy over the budget priorities in the formulation stage
and budget tracking may have greater traction than efforts to influence 
legislators’ contributions to budget debates. At the same time, there may be
greater scope for influencing executive decisions at an earlier stage of the
budget process through direct leverage and influence over the formulation of
expenditure priorities by exposing allocation and implementation deficiencies in
previous financial years.
6 Conclusions 
The case studies reviewed in this paper point to firm evidence of success in a
number of areas of applied budget work, both in terms of the budget process
and budget policies, demonstrating what is achievable in different political and
institutional contexts. Budget groups have achieved considerable success in 
providing an independent and authoritative source of budget information that
has broadened awareness and understanding of public budgets. Several groups
have contributed to improved budget transparency by making this data available
in the public domain through publications and electronic databases on the inter-
net. In some cases they have contributed to the introduction of measures
designed to improve public access to budget data in the form of freedom of
information legislation which has in turn contributed to greater budget 
transparency. Broadening the basis of participation to a wider group of citizens
is more difficult to accomplish, either because the budget process does not 
provide ready access or because budget groups choose to focus scarce organisa-
tional resources on targeted analytical and advocacy work. Budget groups 
working in different contexts face the strategic option of either prioritising
budget information and transparency or complementing these activities by
building alliances with like-minded advocacy organisations to broaden citizen
participation in the budget process which may require additional skills and
resources. It is also a political choice: providing objective information in the 
public domain for other organisations to draw on and utilise is an indirect
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approach favoured by many budget groups but others combine objective analysis
with purposeful advocacy to directly influence budget policies for the benefit of
poor and marginal constituencies.
Budget work can have a positive impact on budget policies by influencing the
allocation and use of public expenditure in a manner that directly contributes to
equity and social justice outcomes. Increasing the level of spending on social
welfare schemes and the efficiency of implementation has direct benefits for
poor and socially-excluded people. The challenge facing budget groups is how
to scale up and replicate the successful impacts achieved to date in areas such as
child budgets, maternal health and tribal welfare across other sectors and in
other contexts. While not all groups have managed to exert influence over
budget policies, these achievements constitute significant precedents which can
inform and inspire similar work elsewhere, based on a combination of sound
technical knowledge, effective communications and strategic alliances which lie
at the heart of successful budget work.
The significance of applied budget work extends beyond the immediate sphere
of budget policies and the budget process by contributing to more enduring
change through the strengthening of democracy. In particular, budget work
contributes to fostering accountability, enhancing transparency, and deepening
participation and voice, each of which are constitutive elements of healthy
democratic societies. Budget analysis contributes to vertical accountability
through ex-ante questioning of executive decisions and actions, and ex-post
tracking and monitoring of expenditure outcomes, both of which contribute to
improved answerability of power holders in the executive. In some case budget
work has also contributed to improved enforcement by securing redress on the
part of state accountability agencies which punish officials for misconduct in
flouting budget procedures or exposing corruption in budget execution through
misappropriation of resources.20 The contribution of budget work to enhanced
transparency is well-established: it contributes to greater openness in decision-
making and makes government information accessible in the public domain. 
Finally, deepening legislative and civic participation in budget monitoring can
indirectly strengthen citizen voice. Strengthening the capacity of legislators to
scrutinise budget priorities and to take a more active role in budget debates
deepens political participation. It also provides an important accountability 
function and improves the deliberative process. Civil society budget groups with
a strong grounding in a wider political constituency can amplify the voice of
poor and socially-excluded people indirectly by ensuring that their demands are
reflected in budget policies and that budget advocacy is supported by sustained
collective action. Promoting voice in this manner may be as important as 
exerting influence over budget policies for the purpose of strengthening
democracy.
20 These are best exemplified by the actions taken by the Mexican government to recover
misallocations of HIV/AIDS funds to an anti-abortion organisation and exposing mis-
appropriation by local officials in India and Uganda.
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